Back to the Ground: A Few Thoughts on How the Comprehensive Approach Could Be Improved

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ABSTRACT

The debate about the comprehensive approach suffers from a conceptual fallacy, or paradox. The comprehensive approach assumes that after agreement at the political-strategic level, coordination on the ground will ensue. Yet, while Comprehensive Approach agreements have been costly and time-consuming to achieve, they have not necessarily enhanced cooperation on the ground. Why? I argue that three 'features of mission-reality' have been overlooked, that provide opportunities for more 'spontaneous' cooperation: 1. agencies have considerable freedom of movement in the field, and use it to behave very differently under similar circumstances; 2. agencies have different, sometimes incompatible identities, cultures and domestic political configurations; 3. in the field, more coordination is not necessarily always better. I conclude with a set of policy recommendations, which mainly call for greater self- reflexivity, accountability and training on these issues for agencies deployed in the field.

1.0   INTRODUCTION

The debate about the comprehensive approach suffers from a conceptual fallacy, or paradox. The Comprehensive Approach assumes that after agreement at the political-strategic level, coordination will ensue on the ground. Yet, while agreements have been costly and time-consuming to achieve on the political-strategic level, they have not necessarily enhanced cooperation on the ground and the impact of the Comprehensive Approach on durable peace has so far been mixed (Baumann, 2013; De Coning et Al., 2013; De Coning and Friis, 2011). In some cases, Comprehensive Approach frameworks have not achieved the expected results; in others, they have actually hindered cooperation opportunities because they narrowed the set of available options. For instance, some ISAF contributors applying national Comprehensive Approach frameworks in Afghanistan found it restricted cooperation opportunities with NGOs that were not from the same country.[i] In other cases, while agencies from the same country were did not want to engage in detailed cooperation but were willing to coordinate to avoid duplication, the Comprehensive Agreement foresaw only full cooperation as an option and, as a consequence, no coordination ensued.

Clear political goals and strategic thinking are crucial to achieve sustainable peace, but focusing only on those two levels may neglect an important dimension: tactical considerations, to use military terms, or, put more simply, the reality on the ground. In order to strive for greater effectiveness, agencies involved in the Comprehensive Approach should try to become more aware of constraints and opportunities that arise from this reality on the ground: on the one hand, factors they cannot easily control, on the other, the existence of less-structured but equally promising coordination occasions on the ground. This paper does not argue against the Comprehensive Approach, to the contrary. But based on research on military effectiveness, military cultures, and civil-military cooperation on the tactical level, it would make some controversial suggestions, that may make us think afresh about some aspects of the Comprehensive Approach, and, perhaps, improve it in some directions. These suggestions are thought to complement the debate on Comprehensive Approach with a specific focus on the operational level and are developed from observing three features of the reality on the ground.

The first observation of this paper is that there are still important differences in the way actors behave on the ground. The comprehensive approach cannot predict or control how soldiers, NGOs and International Organizations are going to use their margins of manouver while in the field. On plenty of occasions coordination at the strategic level did not lead to coordination and success on the ground but instead the persistent differences in behaviour did have important consequences on the tactical level. The second observation is that the experience in the field for various and diverse actors provides obstacles or gives rise to opportunities that go beyond what you may prescribe strategically. Identities, cultures and domestic political configurations may hinder coordination notwithstanding any provision foreseen by the Comprehensive Approach (Bymann, 2001; Baumann, 2008; Gheciu, 2011; Friis, 2012; Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014). Conversely, while in the field, agencies may find room for pragmatic and unforeseen coordination. Third, as pointed out by scholars, more coordination is not necessarily better for the outcome of the mission. Evidence from the field suggests that often one can achieve more by doing less. These three features of mission reality are intertwined in practice but they cover three separate issues: the first related to the impact of specific operational practices; the second to determinants of variations in agencies' practices; the third cover underlying normative assumptions and expectations. It is important to treat them separately to be able to develop specific policy recommendations.

This policy paper is supported mainly by empirical examples from field work experience and observation during the NATO mission in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2012 but also from other cases, namely migration control operations in the Mediterranean and the UN missions in Lebanon. Most of the material is first-hand observation from the author and based on more than 200 interviews conducted during the course of her empirical research with civilian and military agencies deployed. Here I deal with the Comprehensive Agreements in general both across agencies within countries and across. I mainly focus on the role of military organisations in interaction with other actors.

I proceed in four steps: First, I discuss how autonomy of agencies in the field could be exploited; second, I deal with how insurmountable barriers can be overcome; third, I deal with the normative gap that 'more is always better'. Fourth as conclusion, I develop a set of policy recommendations and discuss the limitations and dangers of this approach.

1.1   HOW DIFFERENCES IN THE FIELD MATTER

The literature on the Comprehensive Approach has been overly reliant on the assumption that once actors receive strategic guidelines they are likely to behave accordingly. Both news reports and strong evidence in the scholarly literature suggest that similar agencies behave differently once deployed in operation, notwithstanding the comprehensive agreements they abide by, their mandate and their material resources (Ruffa, 2014: 199). These considerations apply in particular to,the military, which usually are those with the least autonomy. It seems thus intuitive to expect similar dynamics on other kinds of actors involved, such as NGOs or UN agencies, which usually have more autonomy.

In Ruffa (2014), I provide evidence of variations in behavior among two relatively similar armies, both part of the NATO Comprehensive Approach. There, I focus on French and Italian units deployed in the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the UN mission in Lebanon where French and Italian troops operated under an identical mandate in an almost identical context of operation and displayed a similar amount of troops. Yet, the two sets of contingents across rotation showed important differences in how they behaved.[ii] First, French units emphasized patrolling; while Italian units prioritized milder activities, such as humanitarian aid delivery, training the Afghan army and showing their 'friendly' physical presence. Second, while French units remained more detached from the local population, Italian units interacted with them more closely. In CIMIC (Civil-Military Coordination) activities, French and Italian units undertook projects of significantly different types and sizes. French units worked mainly in the agricultural domain and on a limited number of projects. Conversely, Italian units were mainly involved in bigger projects and humanitarian aid delivery:

reconstruction and humanitarian projects, nominally similar to those implemented by NGOs. This suggests that despite similar budgets, Italian units gave greater priority to humanitarian work. Also in force protection- that is how much soldiers protect themselves from potential threats- despite identical standard NATO regulations, protection levels varied: French contingents displayed higher force protection levels with more equipped soldiers and better protected bases than the Italian contingents and bases. In the French and Italian cases, differences in behaviour- a sum of tactical level decisions taken by each contingent- persisted: they are systematic and recurring across rotation. If one projects variations within this small sample- of which I have given a small exemplification above- to the entire area of operation and to all military and no-military agencies involved, one can well imagine the significant effects of this on coordination, coherence and effectiveness. All Comprehensive Approach frameworks have so far been oblivious of the non-negligible variations in soldiers' behavior on the ground.

Set aside important differences across areas of operations, coordination among different armies or armies and NGOs within a specific area of operation has not received attention either. Encounters between soldiers and the local population are not as rare as one might think. Almost all the contingents deployed in ISAF and responsible for a specific area of operation have at least one other army under their operational control. Companies under operational control are usually hosted in the base of the battallion responsible for the Area of Operation. For instance, in 2009 a Greek company specialized in demining and a Bulgarian company involved in operational activities were under the operational control of the Italian contingent. Bulgarian soldiers took turns with Italian to do checkpoints at the entrance of the Italian base. Similarly, a Portuguese unit operated within the French area of operation. Any model Comprehensive Approach shall take into account the systematic variation in behaviour of the different agencies involved and its impact on local populations' perceptions and outcome.

Threat level is mostly indifferent to these observations. To some extent, how good each military is at doing things can be linked to different mandates and different missions: for instance, US soldiers were deployed in much more dangerous areas than Germans and therefore they had to be more effective at countering insurgents, while the Germans could focus on reconstruction and stabilization. However, at a given level of threat, we observe important variation on the tactical level. In the UN mission in Lebanon - a mission that is much more lenient than the NATO mission in Afghanistan- in a recent study I conducted I found that variations were even stronger because of the greater margins of maneuver for soldiers on the ground.

Understanding persisting variation in behavior in multinational missions is crucial for sustainable peace and expectations about what expected behaviour shall entail should be incorporated in Comprehensive Approach frameworks for at least two reasons. First, persisting variations in behaviour among troops are likely to impact on the effectiveness of cooperation among contingents in multinational operations. If contingents are in similar areas of operations and their culture differs or is incompatible, it may be difficult for them to coordinate. While British and American coordination in Southern Afghanistan resulted in many military successes, such as the battle of the Marshes; the same cannot be said for the US and the Poles that have had difficulties coordinating their profoundly different approaches with their similar tactical objectives in Afghanistan.[iii] Pakistanis and Italians in Somalia were also not particularly compatible and yet, had to work in the same area of operation.[iv] Several of these variations are fundamentally not resolvable and impossible to erase, but by allowing more freedom for adjustments and maneuver on the tactical level some of these issues can be dealt with. Nowadays, operational teams often operate using techniques of mission command, behaving -as Krulak's described- the strategic corporal that had to switch activities and tasks from war fighting to humanitarian within three blocks (Ruffa, Vennesson and Dandeker, 2013). Mission command and great flexibility on the tactical level are likely to continue to characterise soldiers' behaviour, which means that operational styles are likely to converge only on the margins and soldiers will keep having autonomy and flexibility to choose among a set of options. In front of such a scenario, we have to train soldiers accordingly and make them more accountable.

Second, we should not forget that these variations in behaviour can severely discard the entire multinational effort and the underlying objective of the Comprehensive Approach (De Coning and Friis, 2011: 267). The argument could work in two directions. First, the hostile party may instrumentally capitalise on these behavioural differences. The *Times Magazine*, in 2008, reported that Italian soldiers were bribing the Taliban in the Suroby Valley near Kabul.[v] This was allegedly consequential: when French soldiers took over the same area of operation, they received a deadly attack after a few weeks, killing eleven soldiers. Notwithstanding the veracity of the allegations, the event confirmed that Italian and French soldiers behaved differently. Similarly, during the UN mission in Lebanon the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* repeatedly accused Italian troops of pretending not to see they were hiding weapons cache in their area of operation.[vi] These variations may also work in the other direction. The local population or intervening agencies may capitalise on distorted incentives and artificially maintain a high threat level or behave instrumentally. The following anecdote illustrates this: the contingent of a NATO country deployed in Afghanistan made extensive use of an old man that would walk in villages with a donkey before patrolling units entered. He would warn patrolling units about Taliban presence by wearing a red T-shirt.[vii] Apparently, he would always denounce Taliban presence by wearing the T-shirt of the colour agreed and the unit just outside the village would always hear fireshots. After a while the contingents realised that it was the old man himself to shoot as he had no interest in lowering the perceived level of threat.[viii] Different units or agencies may also make use of that instrumentally. For instance, it seems that, during search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, the Greek and the Maltese navy detect migrants in distress on rubber dinghies and push them in other countries' Search and Rescue Areas (SARs).[ix]

It is probably unrealistic to expect that extremely detailed Comprehensive Agreements frameworks can erase these variations, nor desirable. But becoming more aware of these differences and using them more instrumentally according to the objective to be achieved is very important.

1.2 INERTIA OF IDENTITIES, CULTURES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF COOPERATION

Once deployed in the field, agencies start operating to implement their respective mandates and follow the protocols of the Comprehensive Approach of the country or international organizations they belong to. Within the literature on the Comprehensive Approach and NGO-military relations, explanatory factors for coordination among actors in the field are usually of two kinds: the differences in the characteristics of the organizations involved, and the differences in the missions where they interact (Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014; Gheciu, 2013).[x] In almost every analysis of NGO-military relations, one finds reference to the varying degree to which different international and non-governmental organizations differ among themselves and, most importantly, from the military. Reviewing the existing literature, Pascal Vennesson and I identified three kinds of often-quoted reasons in the scholarly and policy literature explaining why coordination among agencies on the ground can be hard to achieve. The first focuses on organizational cultures; the second on the core tasks of NGOs and militaries; and the third on the differences in core tasks between humanitarian and development NGOs. In our paper, we then added one fourth variable, domestic political configurations (Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014). There is not much that the Comprehensive Approach can do to overcome these fundamental differences but being more aware of the potential obstacles to cooperation may help. In addition to this, those obstacles may provide unexpected room for cooperation.

First, we found that difficulties of coordination between NGOs and military organizations allegedly stem from profound differences in organizational cultures, understood as "collectively held beliefs, symbols, rituals and practices, which give meaning to the critical aspects of an organization's purpose and goals and often provide a specific language" (Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014; Baumann, 2008; Kasselmann, 2012). "Militaries are presented as hierarchical and relying on strict working structures and standard operating procedures, combined with a set of combat-oriented assumptions about how to use force. By contrast, NGOs are portrayed as horizontal and flexible working structures that emphasize the importance of a long-term community-based approach to humanitarian aid or development. In short, cooperation is challenging because

it brings the managers of violence face-to-face with those who reject a world in which state interests and power rely on destruction and bloodshed" (Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014:8). Following this logic, we expected to find that where organizational cultures differ substantially between the military and NGOs, coordination and cooperation are less likely because of communication issues. The second variant of the organization-based argument addresses the specific core-tasks of the military and civilian actors, understood as those tasks "which the organization has to do in order to exist, in other words, the essential thing that it does and has to continue to do" (Metcalfe et Al., 2012; Stavridis, 2011). When military and civilian actors' core tasks partly overlap, for instance when the military deliver humanitarian aid or development projects, civilian actors may perceive this redundancy as an intrusion in their area of responsibility which, in turn, could trigger competition and animosity rather than cooperation. In short, the more perceived overlap there is between core tasks, the less cooperation is likely. According to the third variant of the organization-based arguments, humanitarian NGOs should be less prone to cooperate with the military than developmental NGOs because they are especially keen to preserve their impartiality and neutrality between 'warring sides' in order to protect themselves while they provide assistance. Hence, traditionally, humanitarian NGOs have been seen as less inclined to interact with the military, than developmental ones. In addition to these organization-based explanations, analysts commonly explain that the level of cooperation between NGOs and the military depends on the characteristics of the mission, particularly its ends and means. Their relationships are allegedly working better in traditional peace operations, where the goals of NGOs and the military are more congruent, while cooperation is less likely in operations that are more combat-oriented and in which the security situation is more threatening, because their goals differ more sharply.

In our article we argue that these two sets of explanations – organization and mission – capture important patterns, but remain insufficient. While the differences between civilian and military organizations are genuine, cooperation is sometimes observed in spite of them. In their relations with soldiers, NGO staff display a variety of behaviors that cannot be accounted for by their allegedly homogenous, cross-national, organizational cultures and core tasks. Some NGOs limit their interactions with the military; others accept coexistence and share information about the populations in need and their location as well as about the assistance projects implemented; others cooperate, going so far as to jointly plan activities. Similarly, while military organizations are more diverse in their core professional identity and in their attitudes toward NGOs than is usually acknowledged, the current literature does not ask where these differences come from or systematically map the variations.

In our paper, Vennesson and I suggest that organizational differences and the perceptions of the mission are nested in distinctive institutional configurations. Our polity-centered approach provides a more adequate framework to analyze the processes through which domestic institutional configurations shape the organizational cultures and core tasks of military and NGOs, the framing of their missions, and ultimately the outcome of their relations. We find that the specific respective French and Italian domestic political configurations may hinder cooperation on the ground. In France, the use of force and acceptability thereof is much less politically charged than in Italy, which makes conceivable to pursue specific paths of action on the ground.

From the above it seems that the literature focusing on NGO-military relations suggests that coordination is independent of the Comprehensive Approach. This per se suggests that the effectiveness of actors in the field will not depend on the Comprehensive Approach but rather on incidental understanding of each other negotiated on site. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is easier to achieve coordination among actors once they are deployed in the field. During the mission, the commonalities of the shared experience, personal relationship, pragmatism may help overcome some of those incompatibilities. Even with incompatible cultures and domestic political configurations, if NGO workers and soldiers understand each other's limit they are more likely to coordinate and cooperate on the basis of some limited, flexible, 'let's see how it goes' basis. For instance, notwithstanding severe incompatibilities, Italian NGOs and military found way to avoid duplication during the UN mission in Lebanon thanks to practice-oriented NGO workers and militaries that did not want to engage in full-fledged coordination but were satisfied with basic coordination to avoid overlapping.

Even facing severe incompatibilities, organizations could potentially be open to coordinate but overly strict agreements may make coordination difficult. Actors with insurmountable and strict agreements might be unable to cooperate on joint project but willing to share information. The fact of being together in the field without strict provisions could potentially work as coordination enhancer and potentially provide bottom up feedback to adjust existing Comprehensive Approach agreements at the operational, strategic or political level. For instance, because of bottom up feedback from the field, the Italian military decided to extend protection to connational humanitarian workers in case of emergency even though there was a general lack of coordination of roles between the military and NGO workers in the UN mission in Lebanon. In sum, even in the presence of incompatibilities, in the field there is room for improvement.

1.3   MORE IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER

My third observation questions a common assumption that 'more is always better', or that striving for more coherence and greater coordination is the only conceivable path to follow when trying to make peace more sustainable. De Coning and Friis write that part of it can be explained by the fact that set political or strategic objectives were overly ambitious (De Coning and Friis, 2011: 270). On the tactical level, in line with their argument, part of the expectations can be due to overly ambitious tactical expectations. Another, however, could simply be explained by the insufficient achievements. The relations among actors in operations has been understood "as a system of interactions, that can involve exchange of information, negotiation, mutual support and planning".xi Vennesson and I conceptualised the spectrum of relations between NGOs and military units as ranging from public confrontation to cooperation.xii On one side of the spectrum, "public confrontation" means an explicit conflict between NGOs and the military, hindering contacts and basic exchange of information. At the other side of the spectrum, "cooperation" refers to the "closest relationship that can exist between humanitarian and military actors", involving the exchange of information, joint planning, launching joint projects and organising activities "around an agreed division of tasks" (De Coning, 2008: 54). In between these two extremes, NGOs and military organizations can "coexist", that is they can put in place the "minimum level of coordination necessary to exchange critical information" (De Coning, 2008: 54). One of the mistakes has been to consider the spectrum as normatively charged and that, in this logic, cooperation was at every cost more advisable than coordination.

Part of the problem has been that the ongoing debate on the comprehensive approach has evolved mainly around the Afghanistan intervention. So the debate has been overall too case specific and it has looked at a case in which: first, coherence was probably deemed to get frustrated because of the complexity of the mission; second, a case in which preservation of boundaries was more important than in other missions. There are other important cases we should study and build on, such as migration control, to see if we can detect similar patterns and if coordination or cooperation are more easily achieved and which order is more desirable.

As we have seen in the Afghan mission, given the profound differences among actors, an ecumenic call for more cooperation and coordination at all costs can actually be disruptive and prevent these actors from working together. But coordination does not necessarily mean to launch joint projects or the military providing security escorts for humanitarian actors. There are many different types of coordination. Coordination may also simply mean sharing information, not even through visits that could endanger the security of NGOs but through phone and other electronic means (Egnell, 2013). Another way to go could be to promote civil-military coordination meetings at the provincial or even district level. In order to build up trust among the local population, it is important not to send contradictory signals and to promote a common image of the mission, while respecting and not blurring the boundaries. But these boundaries can only be respected by coordinating a thousand of small things on the ground every day.

A wide array of problems has been neglected in the intervention in Afghanistan on the tactical level. The debate has focused rather on high level politics, repeatedly concentrated only on developing a regional

approach to solve the conflict and understanding local culture. Yet, some contradictory effects originate from the ground both hindering and facilitating cooperation. This piece has spelt out just some of the effects of the wide array of actors in the field. Having many actors deployed is an opportunity because it allows for burden-sharing and expanding the range of expertise on the ground. In addition, multi-nationality increases the legitimacy of a mission. This, however, comes at high costs when it is associated with poor coordination on the ground. This may be seen as a practical problem but it is also a political one. One could make the choice between bridging the gap among various actors, that still maintain their strong identities, objectives, cultures and practices, and blurring the gap, working towards erasing distinction among all these actors. Bridging the gap seems the most advisable way forward. On the military side, trying to erase differences among different armies would be non sensical and impossible to achieve. Instead, spelling out systematically differences across countries and deploy them according to the threat level and what is most needed could be a great opportunity. On the military-humanitarian side, blurring the gap would be impossible: military and NGOs may do the same things but they do it in a very different way and with different objectives. Trying to value these differences and capitalising on those could be a great opportunity. We should be clearer about what each coalition country has to offer and how each military and humanitarian organization can do its job without duplication, by preserving its original objectives and its boundaries. More coordination is not necessarily better and in some specific cases we need just enough to allow for information exchange.

1.3   CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The policy and scholarly literature on the comprehensive approach has so far presented mixed results on the ability of this model to enhance coordination. In this article, I have tried to suggest that in addition to an array of valid solutions that have come from all parts, we should also take the tactical level of operation more seriously. I have identified three features from the field, namely significant variation in actors' behaviour, potential pragmatic ways to solve deeply-rooted incompatibilities and the perhaps misleading assumption that 'more coordination and more coherence' is alway better. While trying to improve the Comprehensive Approach, a number of policy recommendations should be taken into account.

First, we must overcome the assumption that material resources, mandates and comprehensive agreements are the only factors to consider when deciding how to improve an operation. Other factors matter, such as the military culture of specific agencies in the field. The most fruitful strategy would be to understand different sources of compatibilities across different cultures and capitalise on these variations in the way the units interact in the field. For instance, it would be better to deploy units to areas of operation that are best suited to their characteristics, rather than naively assuming that all units will respond equally well once they come 'under fire' or that all NGOs and International Organizations will react in the same ways. The results of one of my studies also suggest that military culture is particularly persistent, which is why any particular effort to change it, such as General McChrystal's call for creating a common mission culture under the new strategy for Afghanistan in 2010, should not expect overly ambitious results.

Second, at NATO or the UN, decisions about which national contingent to assign to a specific area are either set by specific state constraints or haphazardly. This is even more true at the national level, as units are not chosen according to specific humanitarian or military needs. Furthermore, national contingents are often treated as interchangeable across missions. Yet, each agencies has its own specific weaknesses and strengths. For instance, the French fusiliers battalion used quite extensively in the UN mission in Lebanon should have been sent to Afghanistan where they could have capitalised on their operational readiness. Similarly, the Italian Alpini mountaineering units could have been sent to Lebanon because of their sensitivity to the public opinion.

Third, multinational interventions present clear advantages in terms of legitimacy and accountability, but specificities and compatibilities across cultures must be taken more seriously. Military culture has been shown to impact significantly on the behaviour of peacekeepers in the field, and consequently, is a relevant

consideration for policy decisions about missions. Greater understanding of specific army and unit cultures deployed in operation would greatly increase their effectiveness. The political benefits of launching a multinational operations involving multiple kinds of actors are undeniable, they also come with political costs. Particularly high political costs may attend the participation of national contingents or agencies whose culture is not compatible with the operations or the regions to which they are assigned. The US expended considerable political capital to have European countries in Afghanistan and accepted very restrictive national caveats. While until 2006, those caveats were quite appropriate for the operations, they were not thereafter. And soldiers with a more peace-oriented military culture ended up having to do more fighting. Also, NATO made the same mistake. These elements at the tactical level can be achieved only through better training and greater reflexivity within each agency about how each organization works, what its culture makes possible or not. Pre-deployment training should include inter-agency coordination involving also developmental and humanitarian actors active in the conflict zone to be able to establish patterns of appropriate interaction. It also entails an important reflection on how agencies' work becomes essentially political and is not technical any longer (De Coning and Friis, 2011: 252; Ruffa, Vennesson and Dandeker, 2013) Since agencies already have ample margins of maneuver on the tactical level, also making these actors (the military in particular) more accountable become then all the more important.

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x This section draws heavily on Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014

xi Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014: 6

xii We borrow de Coning's conceptualization of NGO-military relations but we include situations of public confrontation as well: Cedric de Coning, "Civil-Military coordination and complex peacebuilding systems, in: Christopher Ankersen, ed., *Civil-military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice.* (London: Routledge, 2008) p. 54. It is important to note that some scholars and analysts do not consider the variation in relation between NGOs and military organizations as a significant issue because they see these actors as already seamlessly integrated in a global liberal domination project. See for example: Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001, pp. 15-17, 31-32, 35-36.